Information security -a highly contested field of China-US relations
As the recent dispute between Google and the Chinese government demonstrates, information security-related policy issues are rapidly becoming 'hot button' challenges for China-US relations. In the US media, much of the debate has focused on internet censorship. Equally important are economic impacts and implications for national security of a perceived increase in cyber attacks. In fact, both Chinese and US policy makers are searching for ways to improve the protection of information systems that are of strategic importance for economic growth and competitiveness, as well as national security. And the arsenal of cyber warfare keeps growing by the day. 1 In fact, there is reason to argue that cyber warfare has the potential to morph into a new form of technical trade barriers (TTBs) and hence should be appropriately discussed within the WTO (Ernst, 2009b) .
A better understanding of the policy implications of information security-related conflicts requires research on the evolving policies and institutions that shape information security standards. This paper looks at an international cooperative attempt to develop a set of "Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation," explores its strengths and weaknesses, and examines implications for China's policy on information security standards. 2 An information security ("infosec") standardization system seeks to provide assurance that the process of specification, implementation and evaluation of a computer security product has been conducted in a rigorous and standard manner. 3 As China develops its national infosec standardization framework, it faces the task of finding the optimal balance between trade-offs of cost and assurance. China also faces the task of creating a framework within a global economy in which there is already a pre-existing hierarchy and international framework for standardization. Hence, it is useful to consider the global landscape of the technology industry and to study and learn from the strengths and weaknesses of existing international infosec policy models.
The global landscape of the technology industry
As globalization has extended beyond markets for finance and goods into markets for technology and knowledge workers, the organization and geographical mobility of knowledge has increased. Global corporations are at the forefront of these developments. Innovation 1 Cyber espionage is one rapidly growing activity, not just in China but in all major economic powers. Many e t l justiceH lass programs have backdoors placed by the programmer to allow them to gain access to troubleshoot or change th program. Some backdoors are placed by hackers once they gain access to allow themselves an easier way in nex time or in case their original entrance is discovered. A loophole is a weakness or exception that allows a system, such as a HlawH or security, to be circumvented or otherwise avoided. Loopholes are searched for and used HstrategicallyH in a variety of circumstances, including HtaxesH, HelectionsH, HpoliticsH, the Hcrimina system, or in breaches of security. The Trojan horse, in the context of Hcomputing and softwareH, describes a c of computer threats (HmalwareH) that appears to perform a desirable function but in fact performs undisclosed malicious functions that allow unauthorized access to the host machine, giving them the ability to save their files on the user's computer or even watch the user's screen and control the computer. Trojan viruses can be easily and unwillingly downloaded. 2 The following draws on Ernst, 2009a , and the author's studies cited in this report. 3 Hhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Criteria management is undergoing profound changes, leading to increasingly vertical specialization or "fragmentation" of knowledge production. The fragmentation -dispersed engineering, produc development, and research activities -are integrated across firm t boundaries and geographic orders in Global Innovation Networks (GINs). s, the of knowledge which gives rise to a dispersion of innovation hubs, including locations in China. ew and can serve as a complementary option to strategies aimed at achieving technology leadership. rptive e ership strategies is unlikely to support a broadsed upgrading through innovation strategy. y areas.
ies. s can extract greater benefits from deeper forms of integration into global innovation networks.
. ing GINs, and be compatible with existing ternational standards, such as Common Criteria.
ommon Criteria b
Although knowledge production has become collaborative across geographic border new geography of knowledge is not a flatter world. There is clear evidence that the United States, Europe, and Japan retain their dominance in science and in high-impact IP, controlling the emerging new geography of knowledge. However, there is also substantial increase in the mobility Ernst (2009a) demonstrates that integration of Asian emerging economies into diverse global corporate networks of production and innovation has provided these countries with n opportunities for industrial upgrading through innovation. That research also suggests that technology diversification, which combines incremental and architectural innovations, is within the reach of Asian emerging economies, such as China,
The difficulty with solely pursuing technology leadership strategies is that attempts to compete head-on with global technology leaders necessitate a massive upgrading of abso capacity as well as innovative capabilities. In addition to requiring time, these strategies necessitate large financial investments, and are risky with uncertain market prospects. For thes reasons, an exclusive focus on technology lead ba A viable complementary strategy is technology diversification that focuses on the expansion of a company or product's technology base into a broader range of technolog The advantages to such an approach include lower cost and risk, and the generation of technology-related economies of scope by recombining component and process technolog Diversification strategies capitalize on Asia's existing strengths in process development, prototyping, and electronic design, integrated solutions capabilities, and can build on Asia's accumulated capabilities to implement, assimilate, and improve foreign technologies. Focusing on these architectural innovations, Asian firm Pursuing technological diversification as a complementary option to technological leadership strategies has important implications for China's national standardization framework A framework that allows for China's technology industry to pursue technology diversification would encourage network integration, avoid disrupt in C A widely used approach is the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (abbreviated as Common Criteria or CC), an international standard (ISO/IEC 15408) for computer security certification. Its defining characteristics are a focused, flexible, and onsensual approach to standardization. This note provides an assessment of important strengths ea (ITSEC) , Canadian (CTCPEC) and US (TCSEC) , in rder to facilitate buying and selling computer products internationally for government markets s n Criteria seek to rovide assurance that the process of specification, implementation and evaluation of a computer obal had to was costly and time-consuming. c and weaknesses of this approach, and highlights possible implications for China.
The Common Criteria originated out of collaboration between the governments of Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, UK, and the US. These six governments unified three previous standards, the Europ n 4 5 6 o using a single evaluation system.
Currently in version 3.1, the Common Criteria is a framework in which computer system users can specify their security requirements, vendors can then implement and/or make claim about the security attributes of their products, and testing laboratories can evaluate the products to determine if they actually meet the claims. In other words, the Commo p security product has been conducted in a rigorous and standard manner.
The Common Criteria address an important governance challenge of the emerging gl knowledge economy -how to protect global information flows and knowledge exchange against unauthorized access and security threats. National policies, however well-intentioned, were unable to provide cost-effective solutions. In fact, before CC came into existence, vendors evaluate the exact same product in multiple countries, which ncept and the Security Target document. With CC in place, a single evaluation is now recognized by 26 member countries, which cost and time efficiency for vendors.
ns. According to available information, endors in the mid to late nineties reported spending US$1 million and even US$2.5 million on evaluations comparable to EAL4.
7 As we can see from the following chart, time and financial costs both positively correlate to evaluation level: amounts to improved
Multiple trade-offs
While the CC plays an important role in creating an international standard for information security evaluation, there are many valid criticisms of the scheme such as problems of validity and efficacy. For instance, the validity of assurance that the CC can provide is constrained by financial and temporal consideratio v l and costs. To further convolute the pic, there are multiple trade-offs as well between attempts to promote the development of ationa these trade-offs in information security regulation will not be easy. This implies that for Clearly, there are trade-offs between assurance leve to n l industries, attempts to promote harmonization if not uniformity in standards, and attempts to reconcile cost of implementation and validity.
The challenge for policy-makers is that these trade-offs are systemic -an improvement in one dimension may well lead to a worsening in another dimension. Hence, attempts to solve latecomers to infosec standards and certification policies, it may well be advisable to start with incremental changes in the administration of existing international standards and regulations, in rder to find out what works and what doesn't. This trial-and error approach may be a necessary e level of validity in fosec evaluation and its costs -financial, temporal, as well as more indirect costs associated ith possible unintended negative side effects, especially on innovation. n ernment's role and shifting the onus of fosec onto the private sector. By doing so, the CC scheme capitalizes on vendors' collective interest t ti-Level Protection Scheme) extends ell beyond sensitive military and government agencies to cover all non-government end users.
ational defense ople's velihood including education, state science and technology institutions, public telecom
own gning products that incorporate the demands of both andard systems. This is a financial disincentive for Chinese companies to market to CC member countries as well as vice-versa. o prerequisite for developing robust alternative national policy frameworks. 8 There is, after all, no such thing as a perfect, fool-proof model for information security standards and certification policies. The key in future standards development in the People's Republic of China will be to strike a healthy balance between an acceptabl in w
A focused approach
The Common Criteria evaluation and validation scheme is more focused than its TSCEC, ITSEC, and CTCPEC predecessors for the simple fact that the international Common Criteria Recognition Agreement (CCRA) eliminates duplicate evaluations of IT products and protectio profiles. This saves vendors and users time and resources. The Common Criteria scheme also streamlines the evaluation process by reducing the gov in in creating a successful certification scheme.
Although there are criticisms that the CC is cumbersome, and time and cost intensive, i is considerably less cumbersome and time intensive than China's MLPS framework. Added scope and participating agencies create a more bureaucratic and thus slower process. That means new products have a much longer process to go through so new innovations needing certification will be slower to enter the market. A national infosec system, with its evaluation and certification process means that companies that have potential markets in China and CC member countries must double-up on evaluation. This leads to added cost for two processes, and an added difficulty of desi st l ive effect on management and coordination of global etworks of production and innovation. lexibility e and lowers the vendor's burden, but the trade-off is wer validity in the assurance process.
l-or-nothing benchmark allowing vendors to improve their assurance radually over time. ost SS Although China may be able to successfully monopolize China's domestic market through micromanagement of corporate information security networks, the strict multi-leve security requirements and dictation of the organization and implementation of the infosec management structure will have a disrupt n F The Common Criteria is flexible because of its generic nature; it does not directly provid a list of product security requirements or features for specific classes of products. This follows the approach taken by Europe, but has been a source of debate to those accustomed to the more prescriptive approach of other earlier standards such as those proscribed by the US Department of Defense. Less specificity lowers costs lo CC is also flexible in the sense that it certifies seven levels of security assurance. This convention avoids an al g One criticism of the 7-tiered system is that in the lower levels (EAL 1 through 4), CC only evaluates paperwork, and it fails to evaluate the actual computer system. A recent listing o 186 products validated under CC showed a spread b p If this is representative, the vast majority of products undergo only a paper-based evaluation, which does not account for environmental factors. However, once again this is a case of trade-offs; critics of CC already have noted the exorbitant cost of the evaluation proc process would c China's MLPS (Multi-Level Protection Scheme), in contrast, has much more rigorous classification levels MLPS distinguishes five levels of information systems (Ernst, 2009b) . M industries are classified as level 3 and above systems. They must meet the very demanding security requirements of the US Department of defense TSEC or "Orange Book" standard. CA S&T backbone networks are also recommended to be classified as level 3. However, China's infosec product market is still at an early stage of development, and product performance levels do not match that of leading global competitors. According to Chinese experts, the majority of China's addition to the more demanding security requirements, China's MLPS stipulates (Ernst, 200 ) r • ed at level 3 and above. In other words, barriers to the infrastructure. ducts will not be d
•
Chinese national standards post-
• vel 3 infosec product, etc. Chinas-based exporters thus would need to meet extreme and , this will have negative consequences for the competitiveness of all China-based exporting companies, irrespective of whether these are global or local companies (Ernst, 2009b) Consen t from its predecessors in that it is based on the idea that dialogue and cooperation between government and industry is paramount to the success of the scheme and the real , ess infosec products can only meet level 2 classification requirements.
In 9b :
• The infosec products must be developed and manufactured by companies that are "invested o owned by Chinese citizens or legal persons, or the state."
The core technology and key components of those infosec products must have "independent Chinese" or "indigenous" intellectual property rights. For all practical reasons, this prevents the usage of foreign infosec products for systems classifi incumbent global market leaders in the infosec market will face significant entry China market for critical information • To add yet another level of complexity, systems operators must follow detailed guidelines for product procurement.
• Without a mandatory "CCC Mark" certification, a wide range of IT pro allowed to be shipped out of the factory, sold, or importe • Encryption testing requires the sharing of source code encryption keys All products must comply to • Chinese labs must carry out complicated encryption testing and equally complicated market factory inspections. Adding even further to complexity, a level 3 system is required to procure a le stringent product requirements that are unnecessary for commercial success.
These stipulations would require significant financial resources to implement the policy correctly. By adding further to an increase in the China price
sus through dialogue
The Common Criteria scheme intends to engage many communities, including IT produc developers, product vendors, value-added resellers, systems integrators, IT security researchers, acquisition/procurement authorities, consumers of IT products, auditors, and accreditors.
12 The Common Criteria scheme differs ization of its objectives.
The Common Criteria scheme seeks to engage these communities via three forums and organizations. Common Criteria Users' Forum (CCUF), which includes customers, vendors Common Criteria evaluators, in principle, provides an opportunity for stakeholders to expr their perspectives and reconcile problems. Its impact however seems be limited, as CCUF apparently has met only once on October 6-7, 2004. The National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) program, 13 jointly established by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the National Security Agency (NSA), is designed as a partnership betwee t who otherwise would have to rely on unproven security claims. Also, many vendors, including Oracle, view the Common Criteria as the s ic, re companies to divulge code for the evaluation process. This acts to protect the industry's intellectual property, but reduces the validity of the evaluation process since th a iro believes that the Common Criteria labs are not as independent and accountable as they could be. He says that compan n the public and private sectors.
A third way in which the Common Criteria scheme seeks to engage industry is through the Vendors' Forum (CCVF). Oracle's Davidson describes the importance of the CC and vendors' mutual support: "The value of assurance is the extent to which a vendor embraces it across its development processes. That said, since every vendor of [information technology] products claims, 'Our product is secure: trust us!' having a third party validate the product agains the Common Criteria is tremendously valuable to customers, tarting point for assurance, not the ending point."
14 Although a successful evaluation process necessitates engaging industry, a by-product of opacity in the process arising from an attempt to appease industry, is undermined validity. To be more specif the CC doesn't require proprietary softwa e evaluation cannot be verified.
According to Johns Hopkins researcher Jonathan Shapiro, opacity in the evaluation process also gives rise to the incidence of vendors negotiating with evaluators and moving to second evaluator when the first doesn't give them what they want.
15 Shap ies are playing the labs off each other for favorable treatment. An important objective of NIAP is to help consumers select commercial off-the-shelf information technology (IT) products that meet their security requirements and to help manufacturers of those products gain acceptance in the global marketplace. The NIAP program's main objectives are:
• To meet the needs of government and industry for cost-effective evaluation of IT products;
• To encourage the formation of commercial security testing laboratories and the development of a private sector security testing industry; • To ensure that security evaluations of IT products are performed to consistent standards; • To improve the availability of evaluated IT products Oracle Corporation Chief Security Officer and Common Criteria proponent, Mary Ann Davidson acknowledges that vendors "shop" for labs. However, she counters that vendors sh based o op n expertise and cost. "A lab doing substandard work would face scrutiny by the national scheme 17 However, if vendors are playing labs in different countries off one another, it seems that scr e degree of opacity that vendor's retain with CC is important for industry well-being. In contrast to the CC's consensual approach, MLPS is much less l bro d
• l competitiveness and the gth of the economy, science and technology". ." utiny by a national scheme would be insufficient to keep the practice of shopping in check.
Although imperfect and up for debate, th co laborative; the government retains absolute authority through direct management and ad efinitions of its domain (Ernst, 2009b ):
• All systems above level 3 are directly managed by government regulatory authorities.
"National security" is broadly defined to include "nationa stren • "Social order" includes the "stability of any type of economic activity" as well as "the research, development and production of any industry".
olv ment trumps industry (Ernst, 2009b) . The ag da ds:
uses manuals tha • can carry out unannounced cryptographic inspections on any sy • has the full right to exercise complete control over any cryptographic technology used in MLPS system • can access key management and other cryptographic protocols has complete authority to subject violators of cryptographic re p re portion of cryptographic source code must be handed over
18
Increased government involvement and control potentially has two negative consequences ifficult for China to collaborate with foreign companies, hurting China's "absorptive capacity." One by-product of industry's large role in shaping the process is that the CC evaluatio scheme favors proprietary industry over FLOSS (free-libre open source software). According to Saltzer & Schroeder's (1974-5) open design principle regarding security, the protection mechanism must not depend on attacker ignorance. FLOSS better fulfills this principle than proprietary software, and so, as many security experts believe, FLOSS has a security advantage over proprietary software. n urity advantage, Common Criteria assurance requirements reflect the traditional waterfall 20 Despite scholarly consensus that FLOSS has a sec software development model (see Diagram A). Because FLOSS is usually produced using modern agile paradigms (see Diagram B), it is incompatible with the Common Criteria evaluation process.
Diagram A:
At this point, it is difficult for Common Criteria to accommodate FLOSS because the scheme has a certain level of ossification. As a relative newcomer to infosec security, it should be easier for China to create a system that can better accommodate agile paradigms. As Chi develops its infosec evaluation proc na ess, it would make sense to take into account whether or not China w Open Source Software development in China. If the decision is reached that China wants to promote or allow for the potential development and proliferation of OSS, it take into account the differences in the waterfall and agile paradigms when developing the evaluating system. ge market country or in comparison to China's national infosec evaluation framework), which reflects a consensual approach to the evaluation process. One of CC gre
Criteria. There is no doubt that China will seek to use this framework to foster the development of its domestic industry. But in light of China's deep integration into on e some encouraging developments. Leading multinational corporations from the ted a study of the CCRA. No draft of this study is yet available in the public domain. But informed observers are cautiously optimistic that, once the dust is settled that was stirred up by the current Google conflict, there are strong economic reasons for a more cooperative approach to the development of common and widely shared infosec evaluation criteria and standards.
ants to promote would want to
Conclusions
In conclusion, the focused, flexible, consensual approach that CC aims for are some of the evaluation processes' greatest strengths. The relatively narrow focus (or scope) increases manageability and efficiency. CC's flexible, tiered-system that allows companies to not divul code at the lower EAL encourages industry innovation and lowers costs (in comparison to completing evaluations for each atest weaknesses is its incompatibility with FLOSS. The other major weaknesses are inversely related issues of time, cost, and validity, so an improvement in validity will likely lead to increases in time and/or cost.
As China develops a national framework for infosec standardization, it is important to examine how China's infosec framework will cohabitate with the international standardization framework, Common global networks of production and innovation, it would make sense if China's infosec framework would be synchronized with a policy to shape the development of the international Comm Criteria framework.
There ar US, the EU and Japan are now promoting China's participation in the Common Criteria Recognition Agreement (CCRA). They suggest helping China to establish the necessary highquality infrastructure that Chinese certificates will be accepted worldwide 21 .
This has led the Chinese government to announce in early 2009 that it has initia 21 This is a positive development, as it signals that global industry leaders have accepted that their initial policy of passive obstruction has led the Chinese side to be even more convinced of the necessity of establishing a strong national infosec framework.
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